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Abstract 
This article shows how emerging market companies like China’s Haier Group create 
management innovations that are appropriate for an environment characterized by increased 
volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). Dealing with VUCA effectively 
requires practices favoring nimble and decentralized responses; the Haier Group developed a 
platform of management practices under the label Rendanheyi (in Chinese: 人单合一) to 
transform itself from a conventional hierarchical manufacturing firm into a highly responsive 
online-based entrepreneurial company with “zero distance to the customer”. We demonstrate 
how the organizational, competitive, institutional, and technological contexts mattered for the 
development of Rendanheyi. Our study contributes several insights for practitioners and 
academics. First, we showcase how context dependent management innovations are created to 
allow emerging market firms like Haier to deal with a high VUCA world. Second, we draw 
lessons from Haier’s experimentation process for other firms. Finally, we create an extended 
process model of management innovation that managers, in both emerging and developed 
countries, can readily apply. 
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Emerging market companies face a challenging environment, characterized by increased 
volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).1 Volatility comes from, among 
others, varying growth rates and currency fluctuations, making the business environment 
unstable and unpredictable. Fluid market conditions, the impact of new technologies on 
organizational structures, and the unresolved future of international trade rules create 
uncertainty. Foreign investments, including in developed countries, imply more complex 
environments. And there is significant ambiguity, for instance around the effects of maintaining 
existing home-grown management practices, like relationship-based management in Asia, 
versus adopting Western theories and management practices2. But some companies such as 
China’s Haier Group, the world’s largest white goods company, have taken on this challenging 
environment by reinventing themselves and developing a management model that thrives in 
such a high-velocity environment. 
In this article we show how companies like Haier create management innovations in a 
high VUCA context. Management innovation involves the creation of new management 
practices.3 Under the leadership of Zhang Ruimin, the Haier Group developed “Rendanheyi” 
(in Chinese: 人单合一), which can be loosely translated as “integration of people and goals” 
or “the win-win model of individual-goal combination”. Rendanheyi is a platform made up of 
a bundle of management practices, rather than a single new practice. Other such platforms have, 
of course, evolved historically; for example, Toyota’s lean manufacturing has an overall goal - 
to produce on a large scale with minimum effort and waste – and encompasses several specific 
practices including just-in-time, Kanban, and target costing.4 Similarly, Rendanheyi is intended 
to be an integrated and all-encompassing management model with the overall goal to create 
“zero distance to the user” and unleash entrepreneurial autonomy within the organization. 
Specific elements of the Rendanheyi platform include autonomous micro-enterprises, 
performance-based compensation and open online user platforms.  
From the introduction of Rendanheyi in 2005, Haier was transformed from a 
conventional hierarchical appliance manufacturer into a highly responsive, diversified online-
based entrepreneurial conglomerate organized as entirely autonomous micro-enterprises. 
During 2005-2009, Haier operated newly established strategic business units and implemented 
new IT solutions and performance-based measures to better connect the company to customers. 
In 2010, micro-divisions called ZZJYT (an abbreviation for “zi zhu jing ying ti”, translated as 
independent operating unit) were established. ZZJYTs operated like a virtual team and each 
ZZJYT leader had considerable decision-making autonomy, and new performance-based 
measures were introduced.5 In 2014, Haier was eventually transformed into a conglomerate of 
independent micro-enterprises called “xiaowei qiye” (abbreviated as “xiaowei”), operating as 
independent companies with ownership stakes from outsiders and responsible for all 
contracting, budgeting and recruitment decisions. This latest phase has been labelled 
“Rendanheyi 2.0”.  
The case of Rendanheyi is of enormous importance for management innovators, as it 
demonstrates how a high VUCA context in an emerging market can shape novel management 
practices. In the literature there has been renewed interest in management innovations in recent 
years6, but few studies have explored their initial creation process7, and here we focus on this 
so-called “management innovating”. In this article we tackle a major shortcoming of the 
existing literature which revolves around the Birkinshaw et al. model of “management 
innovating”, which is that it largely neglects the role of context.8 As we will demonstrate, the 
organizational, competitive, institutional, and technological contexts mattered a lot in the Haier 
case. 
 Our study contributes several insights for practitioners and academics. First, we 
showcase how context dependent management innovations are created to allow emerging 
market firms like Haier to deal with a high VUCA world. Second, we draw lessons from Haier’s 
experimentation process for other firms. Finally, we extend the process model of management 
innovation that managers, in both emerging and developed countries, can readily apply. 
 
The state of knowledge on management innovation 
 
Firms have long recognized the importance of technological innovations in products and 
processes, but increasingly also value the competitive edge from innovation in how the firm is 
managed. Historical examples of such “management innovations” include advances in structure 
like the (divisional) M-form at General Motors, but also tools and techniques like the balanced 
scorecard (Analog Devices) and scenario planning (Shell). Most academic writing is focused 
on the ways in which existing management practices spread across a population of 
organizations and from one industry or country to the next. 9  While these are interesting 
questions, they do not help to understand the process of developing a novel management 
innovation such as Rendanheyi.  
Still, some work looks at what drives organizations first to invent and then to implement 
new management practices, i.e. management innovating. A major advance in  understanding 
management innovating came from the Birkinshaw et al. process model, which offers a 
template to understand how management practices are created and implemented.10 In a nutshell, 
this model focuses on understanding the active role of individuals, who are called internal and 
external change agents, in different phases of management innovating.  
Internal change agents are, of course, crucial in understanding why and how a specific 
management innovation comes about. Indeed, all management innovations can be linked to a 
powerful protagonist. For example, the founder of Toyota Motor Corporation Kiichiro Toyoda 
and production engineer Taiichi Ohno played key roles in the development of lean 
manufacturing at Toyota.11 Much more recently, the Chairman of the Samsung Group Kun-Hee 
Lee was crucially involved in developing the co-opetition model within Samsung.12 In addition, 
external change agents such as gurus and management consultants can be involved in 
management innovating. 
The Birkinshaw et al. process model proposes that there are four distinct phases in 
management innovating. The first of these comes about when change agents are motivated to 
consider creating a management innovation because of some dissatisfaction with the status quo. 
The second stage, invention, occurs when a thought or real experiment is started to create a new 
hypothetical management practice. In the third stage, implementation, this hypothetical practice 
is put into practice to establish its value. Finally, in the fourth stage, theorization and labeling, 
there is retrospective sensemaking whereby an innovation can receive legitimacy. Thus we 
understand relatively well what actions agents undertake to create management innovations. 
Yet a shortcoming of this model and the bulk of management innovation literature is 
that it mostly black boxes the role of context, even though context clearly matters for the 
development of management innovations. For example, the development of lean manufacturing 
at Toyota benefited from the context of Japan, with its different cultural understanding of time 
as a simultaneous rather than sequential process, its traditionally close collaborative 
arrangements between manufacturing firms and suppliers within zaibatsu/keiretsu, but also 
post-war material shortages.13 And the development of the co-opetition model was supported 
by Samsung’s common language, organizational culture and management systems, which 
fostered close collaboration across the Samsung Group and thus helped towards seizing new 
business opportunities and reducing transaction costs.14  
Context consists of the wider environmental context, “the broad set of stimuli—
exogenous to the focal organization—that shape the management discourse” (e.g. Toyota’s 
Japanese context) and the organizational context, “the administrative and social mechanisms 
that management can manipulate to shape the behaviors of actors in the organization” (e.g. 
Samsung’s organizational culture and management systems). Birkinshaw et al. argue that ‘these 
two aspects of context potentially influence all activities associated with management 
innovation’, but never provided further detail of what these contexts might actually consist of.15 
In other words, how context influences management innovating largely remains a mystery in 
the management innovation literature.  
Still, other work has provided insights into the aspects of environmental and 
organizational context that we can draw from. In the environmental context, the nature of a 
country’s institutions, like its laws, corporate governance systems, and national culture, plays 
an important role in shaping what kinds of management innovations emerge and when.16 But 
technology is also known to be an important factor, as it offers new opportunities,17 as does the 
presence of competitive pressure, which may force a firm to innovate.18  In terms of the 
organizational context, important factors to consider for the successful implementation of 
management practices are a firm’s leadership, especially from the top, fit with the existing 
structure, and presence of resources, including the right kind of organizational culture.19 
To advance knowledge on management innovating, our contribution here is to help 
understand how the environmental and organizational contexts affect management innovating 
in an emerging market multinational characterized by VUCA. An answer to this question raises 
the intriguing possibility that the sources of competitive advantage of Chinese and other 
emerging market multinationals may not just lie in cost advantages, or even the ability to come 
up with innovative products, but also in innovative management practices.  
Our research on Rendanheyi presented below suggests that both the organizational 
context and the environmental context contributed greatly to management innovating at Haier. 
Furthermore, once we start to unpack the two types of context three key factors emerge for each 
type. In the organizational context we found that structure, leadership and resources were all 
clearly connected to the management innovation process. And in the environmental context, we 
observed the influences of competitive, technological, and institutional aspects of the 
environment. Eventually leadership turned out to be the most important of these factors. Figure 
1 below captures the overall model.  
Figure 1 about here 
Our research on Haier is based on personal interviews with senior executives (including 
the Haier Group chairman) and owner-CEOs of xiaowei (micro enterprises) involved in the 
design and implementation of Rendanheyi, as well as external consultants and experts who 
advised senior executives on the company’s restructuring. We travelled to the Haier Group 
headquarter in Qingdao where we conducted most of the interviews. We also conducted a tour 
of the company’s Qingdao site and attended a symposium dedicated to Rendanheyi in Beijing. 
Finally, we consulted internal and external documents to supplement these observations. We 
now discuss the conditions that gave rise to Rendanheyi and the process through which it was 
developed and diffused throughout the organization to boost innovation and to embrace new 
business opportunities. 
 
Rendanheyi: Creating responsive online-based entrepreneurial units 
 
The making of the Haier Group 
 
Like other leading Chinese manufacturing firms, Haier has become an effective 
competitor of Western firms over the last decade and a half. But Chinese firms are not known 
for inventing radical modern management practices. In particular, Chinese management 
practices are said to maximize efficiency and fast commercialization, and innovative firms from 
China are said to “excel at cost reduction, accelerated product development and networked 
production”. 20  This suggests the Chinese management focus may well support product 
development and production activities, but is unlikely to support creativity and management 
innovation. So how was Rendanheyi developed and why did it make sense for Haier to invent 
it? 
 The Haier Group began as a nearly bankrupt refrigerator company called Qingdao 
General Refrigerator based in Qingdao, a city in China’s coastal Shandong province. In 1984, 
a young municipal official Zhang Ruimin, was appointed as plant director and he has remained 
the company’s chairman until today. Zhang Ruimin had a zeal for improvement from the start. 
Already in 1984, he introduced technology and equipment from the German company Liebherr 
to produce refrigerators. In 1990, the company started exports to Europe as a contract 
manufacturer for multinational brands. Chairman Zhang said: “We started exporting to 
developed markets first because if your products are good enough for consumers in Europe and 
in the US, you will have better products in developing markets”. In 1992, the company was re-
named into the Haier Group. 
Chairman Zhang began to focus Haier’s attention around key beliefs that have   
sustained its management innovating ever since: continuous external environmental change  
requires continuous internal change; customer service, not existing products, was key to 
maintaining Haier’s forward motion; price competition would ultimately be destructive; Haier 
needed to offer more, not less, to China’ s increasingly sophisticated customers; the  secret  of  
what  Haier  could  offer  the  customer  lay  in  the  knowledge of Haier’ s employees; all too  
often, an  existing  organization  structure  constrained,  rather  than liberated, employee talent; 
only by making the “employment agreement” equitable to all who are affected by it (customers, 
organization, and employees), could  a  powerful  incentive engine be constructed to drive 
continuous change. Haier’s story can be seen in episodes, eras, or chapters, but above all it is a 
continuing singular story of monotonically consistent change. 
By the 1990s, Haier acquired many other Chinese companies. The product range 
expanded beyond refrigerators to include home appliances such as washing machines, 
televisions, air-conditioners and telecommunications equipment. The company improved its 
products by acquiring foreign technology through joint ventures and strategic alliances with 
companies such as Mitsubishi of Japan and Merloni of Italy. Zhang Ruimin was once quoted: 
“First we observe and digest. Then we imitate. In the end, we understand it well enough to 
design it independently”.21 By 1998, the Haier Group had a market share of over 30% in 
refrigerators, washing machines and air-conditioners in the Chinese market.  
However, the Chinese home appliances market was saturated, while the Chinese 
government encouraged Chinese enterprises to expand internationally. Furthermore, Haier 
faced greater domestic competition, as foreign companies began to expand aggressively in the 
Chinese market. Therefore, the Haier Group began setting up operations overseas, including in 
the United States (1999), Italy (2001) and Germany (2001). It emulated the strategies of 
successful Japanese and Korean firms such as Sony, Samsung and LG in terms of taking its 
own brand to foreign markets and in terms of establishing production as well as R&D in 
Western countries. By the mid-2000s, Haier was an established, successful global brand. 
 
The making of Rendanheyi 
 
Not satisfied with past achievements, Haier’s senior management had the ambition to 
become the global industry leader and to create a truly innovative global company that competes 
on the basis of new product innovations. In 2005, Yang Mianmian, group president at the time, 
said: “We are number three in the world for white goods, we want to be number one”.22 Around 
that time, Zhang Ruimin first used the word “Rendanheyi”, which was aimed at achieving (in 
Zhang’s words) “zero distance to the customer”, whereby the entire corporate structure is 
dedicated to serving customers, giving them personalized products and services, by creating 
independent entrepreneurial units that operate as quasi small independent firms (within the 
boundaries of the company) and have market relationships among themselves.  
Key to the development of Rendanheyi was the spirit of curiosity and experimentation 
that originated with Zhang Ruimin - the central change agent. Rendanheyi essentially includes 
a collection of organizational practices that have evolved over time (see Table 1 for 
Rendanheyi’s key characteristics). From 2005, Haier went through a ten-year period of 
intensive experimentation with organizational structure and performance management. During 
2005-2009, Haier established strategic business units and implemented new IT solutions and 
performance measures to connect the organization to customers. In 2009, Haier announced its 
strategic transformation from being exclusively a manufacturing company to becoming a 
service-oriented company, meaning that it considers manufacturing as only one means of 
satisfying customer needs. 
In 2010, Haier established the first ZZJYT, which operated like a virtual team (i.e., its 
offices were not necessarily physically close) with typically 10 to 20 employees from different 
functional and hierarchical levels, brought together for the project. ZZJYTs enjoyed operational 
autonomy, including recruiting employees for the team, setting compensation rules and 
determining bonus payments. But Zhang Ruimin was not satisfied with the performance of 
ZZJYTs, as he felt that it presented (as he put it to us) “a closed mechanism”, without sufficient 
involvement of outsiders, and hindering faster entrepreneurial development, because employees 
were still paid a basic salary (even though bonuses were added to it) and lacked sufficient 
autonomy. 
In 2014, the entire corporate structure was therefore re-organized, breaking the 
organization into a network of independent micro-enterprises called ‘xiaowei’ to replace the 
ZZJYT. The owner-CEO of a xiaowei (typically 6-8 members, but it can be larger) has a small 
ownership stake (some xiaowei are majority Haier-owned, but some xiaowei are not and Haier 
is currently requiring “continuous dilution” of its holdings) and operates as an entrepreneur 
with absolute autonomous decision-making (including all contracting, budgeting and 
recruitment decisions). The performance of xiaowei is measured against a combination of 
financial KPIs and user value added. The remuneration of xiaowei members no longer depends 
on a salary and is entirely tied to performance. Going beyond the ZZJYT, the xiaowei leader 
has total autonomy, like a CEO of an independent company, and is not subject to headquarter 
approval of any decisions. A xiaowei is not forced to use internal suppliers. Furthermore, the 
xiaowei are actively encouraged to seek the involvement of external partners and partial 
external funding for projects.  
The xiaowei naturally vary greatly in terms of their function. Around 200 xiaowei are 
direct user-facing micro-enterprises developing, for example, new white goods products, 
entirely new products such as water purification equipment and a tablet, or financial products. 
They actively use a myriad of online platforms with millions of customers participating in the 
process of designing, producing and using Haier products, while keeping the platforms open to 
external entrepreneurs to join as partners. Most of the other xiaowei are “node micro-
enterprises”, which provide products and services to user-facing micro-enterprises, for example, 
xiaowei of road transport providers and supply chain xiaowei of factory workers.  
The corporate headquarter provides support for all of these xiaowei, allocates corporate 
resources and sets the strategic direction for the entire organization. The corporate headquarter 
fulfills the conventional strategy-setting headquarter functions and provides corporate services 
such as HR and marketing through dedicated platforms but it is also partly organized as a 
xiaowei, for example, the corporate legal team operates as a xiaowei that can draw up standard 
contracts between other micro-enterprises for a fee, while a xiaowei of the communications 
department develops a cartoon series to help increase merchandise sales and generate additional 
revenues (Table 2 contains a simplified organizational structure).  
Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
The latest iteration of Haier’s management practice has been labelled “Rendanheyi 2.0” 
and is close to Zhang Ruimin’s vision of Haier’s organizational form in the 21st century. 
Rendanheyi is therefore a platform management innovation, i.e. it contains a number of specific, 
interrelated practices. In a historical perspective, this is a logical third phase in Haier’s 
development as a management innovator. In the first phase, prior to Rendanheyi, the company 
primarily copied management practices developed elsewhere such as Business Process 
Engineering, with varying degrees of success. In the second phase, Rendanheyi 1.0, the 
company first created some of its own stand-alone management practices. Now, with 
Rendanheyi 2.0, Haier is successfully creating a number of inter-linked practices. Haier is likely 
to continue to create specific new practices under the Rendanheyi platform.  
It may be somewhat premature to discuss the effectiveness of Rendanheyi, in particular 
the effectiveness of xiaowei that have only been in existence since 2014. But the success of 
Rendanheyi can possibly be gleaned from Haier’s growth in profit margins. When Rendanheyi 
was first introduced in 2005, Haier Group’s profit margins were estimated at below 3-4% 
compared with 6-8% for rivals such as Whirlpool. In 2015, the net profit margin of Qingdao 
Haier Co. Ltd. (one of two listed Haier Group companies) was 5.7% compared with Whirlpool 
Corp.’s 3.9%. And with Rendanheyi 2.0, Haier Group’s profits increased 12.8% to 20.3 billion 
yuan (ca. US$ 2.9 billion) between 2015 and 2016, while the group’s revenue rose 6.8% to 
201.6 billion yuan (ca. US$ 29.3 billion). A key element of Rendanheyi 2.0 have been the 
internet platforms that connect Haier with its users – the volume of transactions on such 
platforms rose 73% to 272.7 billion yuan (ca. $39.6 billion) between 2015 and 2016. 
Nonetheless, Haier has largely been unable to diffuse Rendanheyi across its global 
subsidiaries. In the United States, for example, larger micro-divisions called “platforms” have 
been created instead of xiaowei, and – in contrast to xiaowei in China – for example, every 
employee was part of several platforms and remuneration was not entirely based on platform 
performance. In Russia, the top management team formed a xiaowei along the Chinese xiaowei 
lines, however, rank-and-file employees continued to work in a hierarchical organization 
without forming ZZJYTs or xiaowei. Low adoption levels outside China raise important 
questions about the applicability of Rendanheyi in different national contexts, which underlines 
the importance of understanding how context matters for management innovations. 
 
How context mattered to Haier’s Rendanheyi 
 
In our research on Haier’s creation of Rendanheyi we used the six categories mentioned 
earlier, i.e. three categories in the environmental context and three categories in the 
organizational context. 
 
Environmental context 
 
The three categories of environmental context our research brought up are the 
competitive, technological, and institutional environments – all of which are characterized by 
increasing VUCA forces that have affected the development of Rendanheyi.  
 
Competitive 
 
Haier has been operating in a VUCA environment for over a decade. The competitive 
environment for Haier has become more uncertain since the early 2000s. Foreign rivals such as 
Panasonic, Sanyo, Whirlpool, Bosch-Siemens and Electrolux already entered the Chinese 
market in the 1980s and 1990s. But it was in the early 2000s that Chinese white goods 
manufacturers came under considerable competitive pressure from foreign competitors in the 
Chinese market. In December 2001, China formally joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and opened the white goods sector to competition. The previous sales quotas on white 
goods were scrapped, and foreign manufacturers were allowed to also engage in distribution 
and service activities in the Chinese market. The most important foreign home appliance brands 
(with the notable exception of GE) started manufacturing and R&D activities in China. 
Whirlpool (which previously withdrew from China) re-entered the Chinese market in 2002 
through strategic partnerships with local firms Gome and Suning, while other foreign rivals also 
expanded their presence in China. 
With increased volatility from domestic competition, Chinese white goods firms 
experienced production overcapacity for the first time as the market share of foreign firms in 
refrigerators quickly went up from 26% to 31%, and in washing machines from 31% to 38% 
within a year. A fierce price war broke out. Domestic competition from foreign rivals and lower 
margins pushed Haier to expand globally to counter foreign rivals on their home turf in the 
United States and Europe. In anticipation of China’s WTO membership, Haier opened 
manufacturing and R&D centers in Italy and Germany (2001) and established a US factory 
(2002). 
 As Haier became a truly global company with presence in over 100 countries, it faced 
a more complex environment comprising of many different markets, all with unique market 
characteristics and consumer preferences. It also faced further uncertainty due to slower 
demand and greater competition amidst the global recession and a sharp decline in China’s 
property market. Haier’s senior management believed that its workers were not productive 
enough compared with global competitors.  
The development of Rendanheyi 2.0 coincided with slower growth rates in China’s 
economy, which declined in each consecutive year from 10.6% in 2010 to 6.9% in 2015, while 
total investment in China’s economy declined from 47.9% of GDP in 2010 to 44.7% in 2015.23 
As an additional burden, the value of the Chinese currency has steadily appreciated, from 
8.2765 yuan per US$ to 6.1248 yuan per US$ between the start of 2005 and the start of 2015.  
There were also signs that the white goods sector would become more consolidated. In 
2005, Whirlpool acquired Maytag, once considered one of the most admired premium brands. 
China’s entry into the WTO and greater global competitive uncertainty persuaded Zhang that 
Haier needed to reinvent itself and become a user-oriented organization. Today we know that 
fears about global consolidation were justified as a merger wave has swept through the white 
goods industry. In 2016, Whirlpool purchased Indesit, Midea bought Toshiba’s white goods 
business, Arçelik took over Dawlance, Bosch bought out its partner Siemens, and in 2017, Haier 
completed a US$ 5.6 billion takeover of GE’s white goods business. Competitive pressures 
were therefore also a driver for Haier to start introducing Rendanheyi. 
 
Technological 
 
The white goods sector was traditionally a slow-moving, mature industry. But there was 
increasing ambiguity about the directions for future consumer demand, amidst booming e-
commerce, demand for niche products and a shift towards a customized user experience. Zhang 
Ruimin was an early web enthusiast. When he conceived his early ideas on Rendanheyi around 
2005, he assumed that the Internet would change the relationship between companies and 
customers. Zhang recognized that the internet brought about (in his own words) “zero-distance 
access to information”, meaning customers can get information more quickly than companies. 
In his view, this required a shift from mass production to mass customization. When the ZZJYT 
model was introduced around 2010, Zhang developed a vision of complementary physical and 
virtual networks and envisaged that Haier’s online platforms should be used as vehicles for 
close collaboration with users to develop new products and to provide a customized user 
experience.  
Chairman Zhang was influenced by authors such as Don Tapscott and Jeremy Rifkin, 
who painted a picture of communications-driven technological revolutions in the business 
world.24 He invited many such authors to visit Haier in the Qingdao headquarters. When the 
“Maker Movement” (related to digital fabrication) surfaced, Zhang Ruimin invited the editor-
in-chief of Wired Magazine Chris Anderson in for talks and workshops, identifying everyone 
as a “maker” on their business cards and job-description. Zhang became convinced that 
technology will fundamentally alter the basis of competition in future, moving from 
competition between close-ended hierarchical companies towards competition between open 
online platforms, which can link companies with users and external partners to jointly create 
value. One of Zhang Ruimin’s favorite quotes is “the world is your R&D department”, which 
suggests that R&D resources can be acquired through collaboration with users, through 
collaboration with external partners or through purchases from third parties. He made a 
distinction between a traditional “customer” for a one-time money transaction, and a “user” for 
continuous interaction and participation. Zhang wanted to create a community of users.  
Zhang Ruimin also observed technological advancements made by other companies. He 
was particularly impressed by Apple’s iPad, which became “magical” once app designers were 
invited in to populate the iPad boxes with their ideas, and once Apple’s customers could 
personalize their iPads with the variety of apps becoming available, in the process transforming 
each iPad into a truly unique device. Zhang argued that the iPad was a “platform” for expressing 
and realizing the dreams of other ecosystem players – app designers and users – and that Haier 
could similarly be transformed into a platform for the dreams of others, and, in the process, 
would become faster, more open, and without boundaries.  
Consequently, in December 2012, Haier formally announced that it was “entering the 
networking stage”. On the open platforms that Haier has created as part of developing 
Rendanheyi 2.0, customers are involved in designing products, through discussing product 
features, product uses, accessories, and potential innovations. These online platforms naturally 
greatly vary in size and scope, but – as pointed out elsewhere25 – they have no organizational 
boundaries so that different teams of specialists and even former competitors and other partners 
can join a platform, and can draw on considerable resources to unleash entrepreneurial talent 
and better connect with customers. For example, Haier’s online platform for smart-ovens has 
created an online community of oven users, who communicate, exchange cooking recipes, and 
exchange ideas on ingredients, hence oven customers have strong personal incentives for using 
the platform and, in the process, they provide a wealth of feedback to the relevant Haier micro-
enterprises. As another example, Haier created an online water purification platform that allows 
users to order a test of the water quality at their home and subsequently Haier offers the user 
suitable water purification solutions – prior to the establishment of this platform, Haier 
struggled to sell its newly developed water treatment technology; the platform allowed the 
Haier micro-enterprise to significantly increase sales and to attract substantial venture capital. 
Systematic interactions with users and partners on Haier’s platforms directly led to the 
development of an eclectic mix of new products ranging from a Haier mini washing machine 
for washing children’s clothes to new financial products such as the Hongsheng egg-platform 
for financing egg farms. Against this background of substantial technological transformations 
Rendanheyi resolved/reduced the impact of ambiguity surrounding the directions for future 
consumer demand and helped towards realigning technologies and management practices. 
 Institutional 
 
China’s institutional context was not entirely conducive to the sort of transformation of 
the workplace that was required by Rendanheyi. In order to tackle the VUCA environment, 
Zhang believed that Haier needed to overcome several institutional rigidities and change some 
of the well-entrenched practices that were perceived to be no longer appropriate or effective. 
At the core of this transformation was to ask employees to take ownership of their work and 
become more entrepreneurial. This was a major departure from the traditional top down 
approach dominating Chinese organizations. A former adviser to Zhang told us that taking 
ownership is “not a breakthrough concept in Western management, but in Chinese management 
is really a new concept”. The Chinese educational system emphasized conformity and 
uniformity, producing employees who are used to wait for orders and are relatively passive. 
Zhang recalled that it was difficult for employees in 2005 to accept that Haier needed “a 
transformative process not only for our mindset, but more importantly, for our managerial and 
organizational structure”. In fact, in ten years after the launch of Rendanheyi in 2005, over 
20,000 employees left Haier because they did not or could not buy into the new management 
system. So it seems like employees have self-selected to be part of this set of management 
practices. 
At the same time though, China’s institutional context was conducive to a company that 
wanted to rapidly transform itself. There is a vibrant entrepreneurial culture in China. On the 
one hand, this was facilitated by the Chinese government policy’s push for entrepreneurship to 
become one of the key driving forces for the economy and encouraging and facilitating 
entrepreneurial activities.26 On the other hand, collectivist societies such as China provide a 
suitable context for entrepreneurship. In such societies, the feeling of social inclusiveness, 
collective accountability as well as reliance on social networks enhances the entrepreneur’s 
capability to tolerate uncertainty and risk. Collectivist societies may also be particularly 
conducive to obtaining social capital for new ventures.27  
The flexibility in the enforcement of China’s Employment Contract Law (ECL) 
provided Haier with an ability to quickly reduce its size from over 80,000 in 2012 to 60,000 
staff in 2016 in order to implement Rendanheyi 2.0. While downzising in China is subject to 
some strict rules, the government has long supported the re-structuring of state-owned 
enterprises including mass layoffs28, and – crucially for innovating firms in China – Article 41 
of the ECL specifically permits mass layoffs when a firm “switches production, introduces a 
major technical innovation or revises its business method”.29 Likewise, Haier was able to shift 
the basis of remuneration from paying salaries towards remuneration based entirely on 
performance. Senior Haier managers in foreign subsidiaries in the United States and Europe 
state that their legal systems, as well as entrenched employment relationships in these countries, 
are incompatible with Rendanheyi 2.0 as practiced in China, which is why Haier had to make 
adaptations when introducing Rendanheyi in its foreign subsidiaries. Rendanheyi was most 
successfully transplanted by Haier to Russia, but the head of Haier’s Russian operation said to 
us that it is not possible to have quite the same remuneration systems that Haier uses in China 
because “in Russia we have local law and local worker protection issues” and also because “it 
is quite difficult for some persons to understand why they should invest money when they join 
the company”.  
China’s corporate governance systems also assisted in the introduction of Rendanheyi. 
The Haier Group and Zhang enjoyed considerable decision-making freedom thanks to the 
nature of the ownership structure. Although the Haier Group is under partial public ownership, 
it is technically a “collective” company, whereby its employees own the company. Haier’s exact 
ownership stakes are typically not known, as the ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
in China is often shrouded in secrecy and finding out who the real owners are, let alone the 
ownership percentage, is extremely difficult.30 In reality, the employees receive no dividends 
and do not even know how much they own – and crucially – the rank-and-file employees have 
negligible influence on the strategic direction of the firm. The real strategic power resides in a 
high-degree of strong, top-down leadership at Haier. Of course, this was also true at Steve Jobs’ 
Apple or Bill Gates’ Microsoft, and is presently the case at Alibaba, Xiaomei, Tencent, and 
other innovative firms. 
Zhang’s freedom to experiment with new management practices was additionally 
strengthened because the Chinese government signaled that Chinese firms should increase the 
rate of innovation. This was spelled out in the fifteen-year National Medium- and Long-Term 
Program for Science and Technology Development that focused on “indigenous innovation” 
and was issued by the State Council in February 2006. Furthermore, the Shandong provincial 
government specifically supported Haier’s innovation drive. The Chinese central and provincial 
governments welcomed Haier’s journey into uncharted waters without having to worry about 
the effects of massive layoffs on public opinion. So China’s institutional context actually 
encouraged putting into place radical new management practices as part of the Rendanheyi 
platform. 
 
Organizational context 
 
The three categories of organizational context we identified are structure, leadership, 
and resources. We first discuss organizational structure, before describing the role of leadership 
and then resources, including organizational culture. 
 
Structure 
 All of Haier’s “reinventions” over more than three decades have been top-down driven, 
and have been initiated before many would have considered this “necessary” (i.e., Haier is well-
known for disrupting itself or cannibalizing its own cash flows). Doing this well requires an 
appropriate structure. 
Haier’s structure might both obstruct and stimulate innovative changes in management 
practices. Being originally a municipality-owned enterprise, the functional structure, with tight 
separation between units and departments, might prevent implementing new ideas and meeting 
user needs. At the same time, Haier’s top-down, hierarchical structure helped Zhang Ruimin to 
effectively introduce and diffuse his new management approaches throughout the entire 
organization. Subsequently, Zhang Ruimin was able to adopt an energetic, visionary leadership 
style required to drive changes.  
Organizations that thrive in a VUCA environment, make experimentation a way of 
organizational life.31 Zhang’s strong hold on the company allowed him to keep experimenting 
and reinventing the company. From the 1980s onwards, Zhang took various steps to change the 
company structure and to mould the organizational culture. Already in 1989, Haier introduced 
the practice of “overall, every, control, and clear” (OEC), a Japanese-inspired practice to control 
“everything, everyone, and every day” in order to increase the accountability of all employees 
and to stimulate them to continually challenge ineffective work practices. Subsequently, Zhang 
started to slowly move from the traditional hierarchical and siloed structure into a project-based 
network structure. In 1999 Haier’s organizational structure was entirely transformed into a 
matrix, consisting of four development divisions and six functional departments with greater 
decision-making autonomy. Between 1998 and 2002, Haier reportedly changed the 
organizational structure on more than forty occasions. Operating in a context characterized by 
frequent experimentation with structure made Haier more amenable to later structural changes. 
 Leadership 
 
By the mid-2000s, the Haier Group had become one of the leading white goods 
companies globally. But Zhang Ruimin believed that the VUCA environment was a great threat 
to the existence of traditional companies such as Haier. “When the world changes, we need to 
embrace change or we will be eliminated by the changing world”, he noted on various occasions. 
Chairman Zhang’s key concern was that Haier’s successful expansion also reduced its 
flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit that was needed to tackle the volatile, uncertain, complex, 
and ambiguous forces that he observed. He told us that he observed a similar pattern in Silicon 
Valley: “When enterprises start they are agile, when they become bigger they become less 
flexible”. Zhang concluded that Haier needed innovative management practices to strengthen 
the entrepreneurial spirit and user orientation.  
Like many other Chinese executives, Zhang initially looked up to Western firms and 
consultants to emulate their management practices. He regularly travelled to the United States 
and Europe, visited Silicon Valley and consulted with senior executives at IBM and HP. By 
around 2005, Zhang initiated an HR transformation project in partnership with IBM, an IT 
transformation project in conjunction with HP and R&D collaborations with universities such 
as MIT, among others. At the time, the introduction of performance-based compensation was 
quite novel for a large Chinese company. But the introduced performance management and 
communications practices did not move Haier nearly far enough towards Zhang’s vision of 
empowering every employee. “The traditional methods only cater to the traditional era”, he 
remarked.  
Zhang thought that cutting edge management practices from some IT firms in Silicon 
Valley were not necessarily applicable to a global manufacturing company with 80,000 
employees. Conversely, he thought that no large conventional hierarchical firm in the West has 
yet come up with the sort of radical management practice that he envisaged for Rendanheyi. So 
he decided to experiment with introducing different management practices to bring his ideas 
into reality, looking for inspiration in traditional Chinese writings, management gurus such as 
Peter Drucker and new concepts such as quantum theory and “maker” culture. While 
experimenting with new practices, he was driven by an eclectic mix of ideas such as the concept 
of a “market chain” about connecting the company with the market, Peter Drucker’s vision 
about the changing role of employees as “everybody should become their own CEO” and 
ancient Taoist ideas of Laozi about leadership. Consequently, Rendanheyi became a unique 
product of different traditions and influences that was essentially driven by one leader. 
In February 2009, Zhang first proposed the introduction of ZZJYTs during a 
performance review for the previous month. Zhang experimented with different ZZJYT setups, 
not least because there was a perceived lack of collaboration between ZZJYTs. By the end of 
2012, ZZJYTs and their market chains were grouped into ‘communities of common interests’, 
which were typically led by the most influential ZZJYTs in the chain. But ZZJYTs did not go 
far enough towards Zhang’s vision for Rendanheyi and Zhang finally initiated the shift from 
ZZJYT to xiaowei in 2013.  
The xiaowei came close to fulfilling Zhang’s vision of empowering every employee, 
but it also conformed with Zhang’s acceptance of the ancient ideas of Laozi about true 
leadership. While Haier uses many different communications channels to convey Zhang’s 
Rendanheyi vision to the employees – the “Haier University” training, an internal newsletter, a 
monthly “entrepreneurs café” and Zhang’s personal book recommendations for employees – 
Zhang believes in Laozi’s idea that ultimately “supreme leadership is to make the leader 
invisible”. The xiaowei make autonomous decisions without the involvement of the 
headquarter, like the invisible hand of the market once described by Adam Smith. Quite visibly 
though, without Zhang’s enormous leadership in terms of designing and implementing 
Rendanheyi, the new management practice would not exist, so we would argue that leadership 
is the most important factor. 
 
Resources 
 
To complement the changes to the organizational structure, Zhang developed a new 
corporate culture to support the company’s shift towards responsiveness and customer 
orientation. To encourage simultaneous internal cooperation and competition among the 
company units, Haier’s corporate culture emphasized internal reputation and performance. 
Backed up by appropriate performance management systems, the company emphasized that the 
more productive and customer-oriented employees are, the more decision-making autonomy 
and greater rewards they will receive. The new corporate culture was understandably more 
receptive to the radical changes in organizational practices in the mid-2000s. 
But beyond employing the organizational culture as a resource, the introduction of a 
new management system required resources such as consultancy fees, new IT systems and staff 
training. More importantly, the performance outcomes of Rendanheyi were totally unknown 
and unsuccessful implementation could become a major drain on the company’s finances. 
However, Zhang Ruimin suggested that Rendanheyi would proceed even if revenues and profits 
showed signs of weakening.  
Fortunately Chairman Zhang did not have to worry about resources or the potential 
impact on investors when he introduced his new management system in 2005. Haier’s revenues 
in the mid-2000s were soaring, having quadrupled from ca. 27 RMB billion in 1999 to 103 
RMB billion in 2005. And the Haier Group was under partial public ownership, freeing the 
company from delivering consistent financial returns. 
The freedom to allocate resources distinguished Haier from Western competitors. 
Indeed, Zhang Ruimin told us that he specifically discussed the idea of introducing Rendanheyi 
with senior management of a very large US multinational firm and he was reportedly told that 
“we cannot do it [introduce Rendanheyi] because we need to play by Wall Street rules”. On 
another occasion, a group of visiting European managers from several well-known large 
enterprises accused Haier of fabricating a "Trompe-l'œil" with their ZZJYTs and communities 
of interest, suggesting that such radically innovative practices would be “impossible to 
implement”. A focus on quarterly results and steady revenues keeps American and European 
companies from even contemplating the sort of changes that Rendanheyi requires. In contrast, 
Haier’s resources allowed Zhang to embark on a radical new management innovation, shifting 
the firm from a traditional manufacturer towards an agile online platform driven firm, without 
any guarantee that this turnaround would actually enhance organizational performance.  
 
Lessons for management innovators 
 
The Haier Rendanheyi case produces four key lessons for management innovation. First, 
it is clear that one good response to a high VUCA world is management innovating, i.e. the 
creation of innovative management systems. We showed how Rendanheyi constituted just such 
a response for the Haier Group. The Haier case is quite significant, since this is not a company 
from the buzzing IT sector in Silicon Valley or the innovative biotech sector in Britain’s Silicon 
Fen. The white goods industry is traditionally a mature, slow-moving and low-profit 
manufacturing sector. Yet an environment with high VUCA is challenging this sector too, and 
the Haier example illustrates the necessity as well as the opportunity for established companies 
to invent novel management systems in response. 
The second lesson revolves around how Haier experimented with Rendanheyi. The case 
study demonstrates that experimentation is a sine qua non for success in a VUCA environment.  
In particular, the Haier case demonstrates that leadership may eventually be the single most 
important contextual factor for making management innovation work. Furthermore, the 
management innovation seemed to co-evolve with the ideas and experiences of Haier’s CEO. 
This suggests that those leaders that can actually learn from experiments are best placed to make 
management innovation work.  
Third, we presented an extended process model of management innovation, which 
managers in both emerging and developed countries can apply. The four-stage process model, 
illustrated in Figure 1, describes each of the stages managers go through when undertaking 
management innovation, with the internal and external contexts influencing all four stages. 
Managers must carefully consider competitive, technological and institutional constraints when 
engaging in a new management innovation, while the three organizational contextual factors of 
structure, leadership and resources act as enables or levers for management innovating. Clearly 
the relative importance of internal and external contexts varies from one episode to the next, as 
emphasized by Zhang Ruimin: “[B]oth matter... the first big transformation of Haier was based 
on external factors, as we knew that the market was going to become much more competitive, 
but the next transformation was based on a fear that we had, or would, become much too 
bureaucratic, and so we needed to combat the internal tendency.”  
Fourth, we suggest that managers should align the nature of management innovations 
they create, and how these are created, to the six environmental categories in our model, in line 
with the Haier case but also following other successful management innovators throughout 
history. Where leadership in an organization is strong and charismatic, a top-down creation 
process is more viable, which is how GM came up with the divisional M-form. With slack 
resources, organizations should attempt to undertake more management innovation, as GE has 
demonstrated throughout its history with stretch goals, Six Sigma, and the strategic business 
unit to mention but a few. Organizations that want to be more effective management innovators 
have to build structures that allow for more experimentation, as Procter and Gamble did with 
Connect-and-Develop. 32  Furthermore managers must align their attempts at management 
innovating to what is possible in their institutional environment, Toyota’s lean manufacturing 
being a great example as noted earlier. Finally, they should increase efforts at management 
innovation when technological change is frequent and when there is intense competitive 
pressure, which was part of the reasoning behind Samsung’s co-opetition model mentioned 
earlier. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The main contributions of this article are threefold: 1) demonstrating how the internal 
and external contexts mattered for the creation of Rendanheyi to allow Haier to deal with a high 
VUCA world; 2) drawing lessons from Haier’s experimentation process for other firms; 3) 
providing an improved explanation of how new management innovations are created. 
For the creation of Rendanheyi, leadership was the most important contextual factor and 
our model extends the literature on the role of leadership in management innovation33  by 
providing a detailed description of how strong leadership can drive the development and 
implementation of management innovation. Yet we suggest that leadership would not have been 
enough to drive Rendanheyi through, if the other contextual factors were not aligned and pushed 
in the same direction. In general terms, strong leadership does not always have to be the most 
important factor for every single management innovation. Looking back at management 
innovations, for instance, the initial development of innovations like the balanced scorecard at 
Analog Devices and scenario planning at Shell was neither initiated nor driven by top 
management.34 
The complexities and uncertainties of the VUCA world are driving firms like Haier to 
create management innovations that are appropriate to the context in which they operate. This 
article shows specifically how rapid/timely responses to deal with VUCA lead to context 
dependent management innovations created by emerging market firms like Haier. Rendanheyi 
allows Haier to both connect better to customers and create more internal cohesion, without 
sacrificing scale advantages, due to technology deployment. Our model suggests that managers 
must carefully consider the specific context within which they operate before introducing a 
novel management innovation.  
Some questions on the future development of Rendanheyi are unresolved, as the transfer 
of Rendanheyi to Haier’s foreign affiliates, other companies and other national contexts will be 
challenging. The challenges Haier faces in the implementation of Rendanheyi are, to some 
extent, archetypical of breakthrough innovations. It is well documented that key stakeholders 
are often cautious and even unwilling to adopt/participate in breakthrough innovations for a 
myriad of reasons. 35  More fundamentally, as we have seen, there are cultural and legal 
impediments that limit Rendanheyi’s applicability in other institutional contexts. Rendanheyi 
may not work as well, or not at all in other countries and, in fact, the implementation of 
Rendanheyi has been very limited in Haier’s foreign affiliates. Haier executives still hope to 
eventually transfer Rendanheyi to Haier’s global affiliates, but the takeover of GE’s white 
goods division may render this objective even more difficult. 
Within those affiliates where Rendanheyi has been fully introduced, Haier also needs to 
consider some crucial issues going forward, including how organization-wide process 
innovations can be implemented by semi-autonomous xiaowei, given that user-facing xiaowei 
are obsessed with product innovations with relatively quick payoffs and are less concerned with 
longer-term collective interests of the Haier Group. As the Haier Group is progressively diluting 
its ownership stakes in the xiaowei, Haier must also consider how successful xiaowei can be 
prevented from fully disengaging themselves from the Haier Group organization. Although, 
one possible future for Haier would be to transform into a “flotilla” model away from the “ocean 
liner”, as Zhang Ruimin has already indicated that “we may be entering the era of losing control” 
in the quest to serve customers better, and to continue to unleash talent. 
Future research will need to further investigate to what extent Rendanheyi and other 
context-specific management innovations from emerging countries are transferable across 
national borders and organizational boundaries. There is much evidence that the transfer of 
organizational innovations across institutional contexts often fails. The failed or incomplete 
transfer of management innovations from Japan to the West and the mixed success of novel 
hierarchy-free organizational forms such as holacracy should serve as a warning to managers.36 
As we have seen, China’s institutional context is particularly conducive to Rendanheyi. There 
is no written manual for introducing Rendanheyi and, in fact, the ambiguity and vagueness of 
the precise contents of Rendanheyi is typical of most Chinese management models, as Chinese 
organizations tend to develop broad and imprecise strategies that are short on details and vague 
on the specific steps to implement them.37 Furthermore, Rendanheyi took a long time to develop 
into what it is today, and compared to key historical management innovations, only the making 
of Toyota’s lean production platform has taken as long.38 Haier’s long experimentation with 
Rendanheyi may have been an important reason why the practice was successfully implemented 
within the company, since the practice was moulded by the specific experiences of the company 
and Haier employees gradually got used to assuming greater management responsibilities. 
Therefore, the Rendanheyi case suggests that organizations must be cautious before cutting and 
pasting radically innovative processes and mechanisms to obtain the same goals. Nonetheless, 
some elements of Rendanheyi could well be emulated by companies around the world and this 
case will surely inspire managers and academics working with management innovation.  
 
  
TABLE 1. Key characteristics of Rendanheyi and Rendanheyi 2.0 
 Rendanheyi (2005-2014) Rendanheyi 2.0 (from 2014) 
Organizational structure Organizational hierarchy with 
increasing autonomy for 
corporate units – moving from 
strategic business units to 
micro-divisions called ZZJYT 
Collection of independent 
micro-enterprises called 
xiaowei 
Ownership 100% Haier Group owned Variable ownership of micro-
enterprises with stakes from 
external partners, initially 
majority Haier Group owned 
but increasingly diluting 
ownership 
Corporate unit 
performance evaluation 
Baseline targets for sales and 
profitability set by headquarter 
for SBUs/ZZJYTs and unit 
leaders 
Performance measured against 
a mix of financial KPIs and 
user value added 
Individual performance 
remuneration 
Basic salary plus individual 
performance-related bonuses  
Remuneration based entirely 
on micro-enterprise 
performance 
 
 
TABLE 2. Simplified organizational structure of Rendanheyi 2.0 
 Type of organization Main function 
Tier 1 xiaowei user-facing micro-enterprises design, develop, manufacture and 
distribute products and services 
Tier 2 xiaowei node micro-enterprises provide products and services to 
Tier 1 micro-enterprises 
Corporate headquarter corporate services platforms provide services to Tier 1 and Tier 
2 micro-enterprises, set the 
strategic direction for the entire 
organization, allocate resources 
 
  
FIGURE 1. Management innovating model with contextual factors  
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